USC Trojan Football Analysis

2005 Season - 2006 Rose Bowl: 4th & 2

A friend asked me to post this and I somewhat reluctantly agreed. I imagine just hearing the term "2005 Rose Bowl" or "4th and 2" makes some people cringe in the USC fan base. I watched the game a couple times and the much discussed 4th & 2 play about 20 times after the game and then made my peace with it and moved on. There is still a lot of second guessing and pot shots taken at the coaching staff by fans and even some in the media though for the play call at end of the game. For those interested I'll give you my take on why the staff made the call in question, why it was a good one under the circumstances, and what actually broke down in hindsight. I'll also explain why some of the criticism regarding the play is either off base or just somewhat poorly thought out in several cases. I'm not a big believer in second guessing after the fact. It rarely serves a purpose in life unless the focus is put on the "how" something worked or "why" it did not work for learning purposes. Merely focusing on the "who to blame" strikes me as a form of scapegoating or mere complaining. With that said here is some data and pictures for those interested about the play in question. If you think it might give you some peace of mind to review the situation in detail then I suggest reading on...if not I suggest just skipping it.

Before diving into the 4th down play play I think it is useful to know what the coaches said afterwards. Then at the end you can compare their comments to the typical criticisms I've heard from fans and reporters. After the 2005 Rose Bowl game in an interview with local authors Steve Bisheff and Loel Schrader Pete Carroll commented, "I'll have to watch it again later, but not right now. I hate that game - hate it. I hate that game because we had so many ways to win it". When asked if the Trojans play their best Pete replied, "No, we didn't". "We struggled defensively against their QB (Vince Young). There were so many opportunities. The ball was on the ground five times and we only got one (turnover). There were some instant replay opportunities and not one went our way - stopping them on 4th down situations, the interception that was called incomplete. There was a time when we could have won the game running away. We are up 12 points and the ball falls straight to us. We would have had the ball again if the fumble had been called. Also if not for LenDale White's fumble near the end we would have scored every time we had the ball in the second half. The offense was just smoking." This is fairly typical of what I have heard the coaching staff state about the game. The offense was good especially in the second half, the defense had problems, and the Trojans failed to capitalize on opportunities or created mistakes.

There were indeed a dozen or so plays that could have turned the game for USC. The missed turnover opportunities for example, the early interception thrown into the end zone by Matt Leinart near the goal line, a failed 4th and 1 call in the first half instead of kicking a field goal, the Reggie Bush lateral fumble, and many others. Oddly the one aspect that many fans choose to recall however is the drive where USC is attempting to run out the clock with a five point lead. On the 45 yard line facing a 4th down and two yards to go the staff elects to go for the first down and win rather than put a tired defense back on the field to stop Vince Young. On that final drive in the last three play series alone there was an incomplete pass to FB Brandon Hancock which stopped the clock, LenDale White's first fumble of the season on 3rd and 7, and then the final fourth down play. Here are some reminders of those less mentioned items just on the final drive itself...

2nd and 7 Screen Play - 1	2nd and 7 Screen Play - 2	2nd and 7 Screen Play - 3

USC lines up in a 2 TE Straight I Formation with WR split out left. #40 Brandon Hancock if the fullback and LenDale White is the tailback.	The fullback Hancock releases to the flats. Texas LB Kelso blitzes on the play and Leinart hurries the pass slightly.	The pass falls incomplete at the feet of Hancock stopping the clock with 2:23 left to play in the game.

3rd and 7 Play - 1	3rd and 7 Play - 2	3rd and 7 Play - 3

1. Here is the formation of the play on 3rd down and seven to gain for the first down.	2. What most people forget is that LenDale nearly picked up the first down on this play and might have. Here the Texas defender #31 DB Ross puts his helmet on the ball which then pops out.	3. The ball coming out was hard to see on the replay but you can just see here that miraculously it pops a yard to two backwards from where LenDale finally lands (obscured in the picture) and right into the hands of Steve Smith who is then dragged down.

Both of these plays (and others of course) directly affected the drive by USC and the game but they are less discussed for some reason. If Matt Leinart's pass to Brandon Hancock is slightly higher he picks up a few yards and more importantly the clock keeps rolling. At a minimum it forces Texas to burn one of their 3 time outs remaining. Given that Texas eventually scored at the :19 second mark this could have made a difference. More interestingly and rarely mentioned however is the fumble that Pete Carroll mentions by LenDale White on 3rd down and 7 yards after the failed pass to Brandon Hancock. At the tail end of his run the ball pops out and luckily for the Trojans Steve Smith recovers the ball in mid air. This little mishap that Pete Carroll notes above cost USC a couple of yards at the end of the play. LenDale nearly picked up the first down on 3rd and 7 and just might have depending upon the mark. Instead with the fumble Steve Smith is tackled a yard to two back from where LenDale White finished and this sets up the more famous 4th and 2 play. Amazingly this was the only fumble by LenDale White all season long and it was a good solid hit by the Texas player Aaron Ross. USC was quite lucky to even get to attempt the 4th down play in hindsight.

Texas called time out after this near fumble play to stop the clock and set their defense. USC head coach Pete Carroll was on the head set and conferred during the time out with Lane Kiffin, Steve Sarkisian, as well as Matt Leinart. The decision was to go for first down and try to avoid putting the tired USC defense back on the field. The play was to run LenDale White off left tackle out of the 2 TE Straight I Formation.

Why this particular play or formation? Why LenDale White and not Reggie Bush in hindsight? That is what usually fans seem to ask the most. The coaches knew a few things from history, data, and the events of this game that most of us are not privy to at the moment the decision is being made. I have not heard any fans suggest that USC should have thrown the ball in this situation. The decision was to run the ball was and in reality I suspect it was a pretty easy one for the coaches to make. USC had the #6 rushing attack in the nation in 2005 averaging 260 yards per game and 6.4 yards per carry. The offensive line consisted of Winston Justice, Fred Matua, Ryan Kalil, Deuce Lutui, and Sam Baker. All were (or will be in the case of Sam Baker) drafted into the NFL although Fred Matua did not stick with a team. Running behind this line with their best short yardage back in the country was an easy call for the staff.

In the actual Rose Bowl game Reggie Bush and LenDale White were both averaging about 6.2 yards per carry but that is where the similarity ends. Reggie Bush generated his main yardage going outside in spread formations with 3-4 WR's in the game for USC on downs where there was a clear threat of a pass play. Hence he was often only facing six or seven men in the tackle box. Here are three different sample formations in the game that were used with Reggie Bush in the game for USC.


Here is the most typical a 3 WR (2x1) Set with Reggie Bush at tailback. Seven defenders in the box for Texas against this alignment. On this particular play Reggie was still stopped for a 2 yard loss.	Here USC lines up with 4 WR's overall and 3 of them in a bunch formation to the left and Reggie Bush at tailback. USC snapped the ball before Texas was set on this play and Reggie got outside to the left for a big gain of 17 yards.	Here is another example of a spread type formation with Reggie Bush in the game. This is a 3WR I Formation with no tight end in the game. This was the other fairly big run that he broke lose for in the game to the outside right.

Conversely LenDale White ran mostly between the tackles as he had all his career at USC. LenDale White gained his yards against Texas running against seven, eight and even nine men in the box on some plays from various alignments with the I Formation. Here are the three such samples.


I Formation with the FB set strong side and WR in motion. LenDale runs for a 14 yard gain up the middle breaking tackles.	2 TE I Formation near the goal line on the second drive of the game. WR is split right. LenDale runs left in for the touchdown against a stacked line	On this play LenDale White is the decoy as the play call instead is a pass to the fullback.

More importantly however here are some histograms of the tailback's respective rush yardages and you will see further what I mean about the aforementioned differences. During the game Reggie Bush had 13 carries for 82 yards (6.3 average). However in reality he had five runs where he gained 70 yards (14.0 yard average) and eight runs where he gained only 12 yards (1.4 yard average).

Above and to the left in the chart you can see the cluster of the runs that Reggie had that resulted in little or no yardage. On the right side of the chart are the five bigger plays that he did break to the outside. The distribution is somewhat bimodal in this sense. Specifically six times (or about half his carries in the game) Reggie Bush ran the ball for two yards or less (-2, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2). That pattern is partly no doubt what scared off the coaches. On the other seven of his runs conversely he did gain 3 yards or more (3, 5, 9, 9, 9,17, 26) but generally using spread formations in passing situations where the field was much wider open. Unfortunately there was just no way that Texas was going to spread the field out and put only six or seven men in the box on defense on this particular play. Even if USC did this somehow via a different formation the result still was not automatic by any stretch of imagination. It might have been just like the play early in the game where Reggie was forced out of bounds for a two yard loss on a run play. (Hey if we are going to second guess the coaches we have to also second guess the critics with some data and actual game observations to be fair don't we?). Here for example is Reggie losing two yards on the first drive of the game.


1. 3 WR Formation with Reggie Bush as the single tailback in the game. Texas is in a basic 4-3 Over defense with a Cover 2 shell in support.	2. Hand off to Reggie Bush up the middle. Reggie sees no room in the middle of the field once he receives the hand off and decides to bounce the play outside to the right.	3. Reggie is cut off by the fast pursuit of the Texas secondary. Ultimately he is forced out of bounds on the ten yard line for a two yard loss on the play.

How did LenDale White do in the same respect? Here is the histogram for his runs in the Rose Bowl. Overall he ran 20 times for 124 yards and a 6.2 yard average. Technically before the 4th down play in question he had 19 carries for 123 yards. The run chart looked something like this when you plot the data. (Note: In the booth the coaches would have had a running tally of sorts drawn up manually and not this exact chart of course).

As you can see LenDale White had a much more consistent run average during the game. Before the final play in question he had only been stopped for 2 yards or less a couple times in the game. Most of the time he was reliably gaining three to five yards per carry with a couple of much bigger runs as well. Preceding the final carry LenDale White gained better than two yards on 17 of his 19 runs (89.5%). More impressively these were done out of tighter formations with more Texas defenders packed into the tackle box. Given that Texas would be cheating on defense against the run on the 4th down play in hindsight it was an easy call for the coaches to make. Put power against power and execute what had been a staple of the Trojan rush offense that year. The play had worked throughout the game even in one earlier fairly predictable situations on the goal line. For example here is the earlier 2 Tight End Straight I Formation play where LenDale quite easily ran for a four yard TD against a stacked defense. This play (as well as numerous others) would have been on the coaches minds and marked down as a successful play on their tracking sheets in the booth.

"So okay even if Reggie is not running ball he should be on the field as a decoy somehow right?" is how the next line of second guessing usually goes. Well, that is easy to say as a fan or sports writer without supplying the necessary details but it is suddenly a lot tougher when you actually map it out on paper. Specifically on short yardage plays USC normally goes to a 2 Tight End I Formation. Conceptually it looks like this diagram.

This is called 22 Personnel where there are two backs, two tight ends, and only one wide receiver in the game. As you can probably see there is not a slot open for Reggie Bush to simply jump into. If you plug Reggie in at WR instead of #8 Jarret it does not accomplish anything as the corner back and safeties don't necessarily move. So it sounds nice in theory but in actuality putting Reggie Bush in means either taking out LenDale White, removing a valuable blocker or going to another formation entirely. Given the actual data from above there was clearly no reason to put Reggie in at tailback instead of LenDale White. Changing the formation to something else also goes against what had worked all year long as well as in the game for no logical reason either. Put Reggie and LenDale in together? Well it basically means then taking a blocker out of the play. On short yardage taking a blocker out just makes no sense. So from the coaches point of view this was a sound decision and I don't personally second guess this part of the play.

Here is how the USC players actually lined up on the play. It appeared on the replay that Kyle Williams was in at the back side tight end spot and not Jimmy Miller or Nick Vanderboom.

Here is how Texas actually lined up on the play as they had on previous plays. It looked like starting DT Frank Okam #97 was out of the game and #92 DT Dibbles was in instead. The free safety looked like #26 Marcus Griffin and not #27 Michael Griffin. #40 LB Killebrew was out and #4 Kelson was in for the Longhorns. (Note: It was tough to tell for sure on a couple of the players).

Here are the resulting match ups on paper.

Here is the rough design of the play from what I could discern from the TV angle (which is not ideal to say the least!).

The play was run to the strong side of the formation with Fred Matua pulling from the back side and LenDale White following fullback David Kirtman, right guard Fred Matua, and then looking for a hole off of either left guard Deuce Lutui or left tackle Sam Baker. The key to making this play work is simple old fashion run blocking 101. USC has five people attacking the left side of the field (Davis, Baker, Lutui, Kirtman, and White). Texas had five defenders (Kelson, Robison, Wright, Huff and Harris). The center position and to the right should not have too much to do with the play and neither should the deep Free Safety. So from a numbers point of view things were even. The key is how well the blocking occurs.

My guess from observation is that the intent was for Fred Davis to briefly combo block #39 DE Brian Robison with Sam Baker. Then he would try to move out onto the linebacker #2 Harris. Sam Baker appeared to have the difficult task of trying to get to the outside left shoulder of the DE Robison who is also charging forward into the gap. If Davis can get to the linebacker, and Baker can reach Robison then the play is off to a good start. Then Strong Safety #7 Michael Huff (or anyone else in the way) would be hammered by right guard Fred Matua pulling from the back side. Fullback Kirtman needs to block the LB #4 Kelson squatting outside the tight end on the play.

Here is the 4th and two sequence of what occurred in pictures from left to right snapped at short intervals...


1. 2 TE I Formation with FB set strong side and WR split left as well to the open side of the field.	2. Play begins on a quick snap and USC does not seem to have the initial advantage despite the quick call.	3. Leinart comes back to hand off the ball to LenDale White and back side guard Fred Matua starts to come in motion pulling from the back side.	4. The initial surge at the LOS is mixed at best once LenDale White receives the ball. In the middle of the field a lineman is effectively knifing sideways starting to create a pile up in the left center of the field (from offense point of view)

5. Several Texas defenders are beating their blockers at this point and closed off the middle of the field. Fred Davis is attempting to get to the LB Harris. Kirtman blocks Kelso.	6. LenDale White charges forward and runs behind Fred Matua who is putting a helmet onto Michael Huff. Harris has shed the block of Fred Davis now falling down.	7. At this point forward progress is nearly stopped by the semi-hidden linebacker Harris and the effects of the pile up. Strong Safety Michael Huff belatedly now as well applies force.	8. Still somehow White is able to move the pile forward and almost make it to the yellow line before being pushed entirely down to the ground.

It would be nicer to have the end zone view of the play for a better confirmation of events but the TV broadcast did not capture or replay that angle.

As the play unfolded Texas gets off the line of scrimmage very well. It appears that several things just don't go exactly as planned in terms of execution. For starters Sam Baker does not appear to get to the outside shoulder of the defensive end. Instead #39 Robison actually appears from this angle to get under the block and starts a massive pile up that is joined by #90 DT Rodrique Wright. Fred Davis is also unable to get all the way out onto the linebacker Harris. Matua almost gets to Huff but can not apply leverage to move him out of the way. As a result both Harris and Huff are alive in the play in addition to the pile up created by Robison and Wright. Here the pictures highlighting those points that were later shown but not mentioned on the replay on TV from the side angle with a little closer view.

1. From this angle you can see that #83 TE Fred Davis did not quite reach Texas LB #2 Harris in time on the play. Harris is able to get just inside of the block and help plug up the middle. Just visible is #39 DE Robison (left of #7 Huff) who made the play in my opinion. LenDale White is not visible but you can just make out the jersey image of #51 Fred Matua attempting to get to #7 Michael Huff to make his block (assuming that was his assigned defender). Hidden behind Matua is LenDale White.

2. Here LB #2 Harris has clearly gotten the angle on LenDale White as he makes his final push forward. Texas LB #4 Kelson also is grabbing White from behind. Squatting down bent awkwardly sitting on top of the USC player Fred Matua who fell underneath him is #7 Strong Safety Michael Huff. Oddly despite not making the initial pile up condition (DE #39 Robison did) or forcing the tackle (LB #2 Harris did) Huff somehow gets official credit for the tackle in the final game statistics! Such is life.

Despite all the problems and Texas controlling line of scrimmage the play still almost worked for USC due to the sheer force, strength, and effort of LenDale White. Unfortunately the pile up started by DE Robison and joined by DT Rodrique Wright just did not leave much of a hole for him to find. Texas won the battle of blocking up front. Later on after the game LenDale stated that he thought he should have hesitated a moment and cut through a small opening he saw. I'm not sure it would have mattered. In reality the heroes on the play for Texas were probably in order DE Robison, DT Wright, LB Harris, and then LB Kelson. Strong Safety Michael Huff does comes in also at the tail end of the play but from this angle really does not even make the tackle. Since his number is most visible at the end though he got credit for the tackle by the official stat keepers. This unfortunately adds fire to the notion that Reggie Bush should have been in this formation somehow as a decoy to somehow move Huff out of the play.

Unfortunately the Texas line of defenders just made better execution than the USC offense on this particular play. Still as you can see below the mark was close and the play was only stopped by about 6 inches short of the goal. If the previous incomplete pass to Hancock had not occurred, if the LenDale White fumble did not occur or a dozen other small things none of this of course matters. But this is football and it is a game of execution, skill, effort, and of course mistakes.

Can fans or the media second guess the play call? Sure that is the nature of the game. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight of course it is easy. Given the situation and facts at the time however it was a good sound call as strange as that may sound...it just didn't work by about six inches for reasons of execution. What might have been done differently? I don't personally fall for the "put Reggie on the field as a decoy" line of thinking. That is just blissfully ignoring the reality of the situation, taking away a blocker and assuming that Texas would be tricked somehow, or that Reggie might heroically make a play like the "Bush Push" or something. It is just wishful naive thinking that I entirely understand. No one likes to lose especially in this manner - not even Pete Carroll as indicated by his comments above.

As often is the case of football some very minor things might have made a slight difference on this play. USC went on a quick snap count and it did not catch Texas off guard at all. In reality the Longhorns appeared to be expecting it and got off the ball as quickly it appears as USC did in replay. Putting the WR #8 Jarrett in motion might have made a difference if he could crack block on one of the Texas defenders. This of course however also brings the cornerback into the play and adds some element of risk. Putting the fullback Kirtman in the Straight I position instead of offsetting him to the strong side might have put LB Harris a step or so more towards the center of the field. That in turn might have allowed Fred Davis an extra split second to locate him and put a more solid block on him. Running to the right side of the formation instead of the left might have caught Texas more off guard. However the Longhorns crashed that side of the line pretty well also. It is all just idle speculation and pointless second guessing as far as I am concerned.

Interestingly it leaked out after the game in interviews that the counter to the play briefly discussed and dismissed by the coaching staff was to have Matt Leinart run a naked bootleg out of this formation. It might have caught Texas off guard but again perhaps not. Due to the nature of the game we will never know for sure. This play will of course go down in history for both Texas and USC. The second guessing will continue forever as well. I'd prefer if the criticism focused more on the "why" and "how" component of the play instead of simply placing blame on the "who" part of the equation. Unfortunately that is more difficult to do in today's society of superficial criticism and rapid sound bites. I hope I have not been too guilty of that myself in this case. I also hope this gave at least a few people some better peace of mind on the matter. Good play calls sometimes fail and bad ones can also work. It is the nature of the game and it all comes down to execution in the end.

UPDATED INFORMATION

Since the game was played and since I made this original post several more pieces of information have come into the public arena. Ryan Kalil center and captain of the offensive line that day spoke at a USC dinner and in response to a question about this play call still 100% agreed with it. He stated that it was the right call for the situation but uncharacteristically two Trojans he did not want to name missed their assigned blocks on the play...

Here is a link to a different piece of information by Pat Forde of ESPN. The article is about the growing number of coaches that go for it on 4th down such as Pete Carroll. Despite failing on this play Pete Carroll said he would make the same call all over again. "I could care less about that [being criticized]," Carroll said. "I'm just doing what's right for us. If your philosophy is not to be scrutinized, you kick the ball deep and play defense." It was Carroll's decision not to kick the ball deep and play defense in the 2006 Rose Bowl that will live in infamy in some quarters. It was arguably the most famous and important failed gamble in college football history. USC was trying to hold on to a dwindling lead against Texas in the Rose Bowl when Carroll decided to go for a fourth-and-2 from the Longhorns' 45-yard line with 2:13 left. Get the first down, and a historic three-peat championship is in the books. Don't get it, and Vince Young has one more shot at a collapsing USC defense. When LenDale White was chopped down short of the sticks, Texas had the ball, had field position and had even more momentum. The rest is history: Young carved up the Trojans on a final drive to score the winning touchdown with 19 seconds left and capture the national championship. "We were playing in a championship game every weekend, so no game at the end of the year was different than the entire year," he said. "It fit perfectly. We just missed a cutoff block on the back side is all. If we make that, we're the all-time all-timers." If you miss it, well, you're second-best. But USC didn't put itself in the position to be the all-time all-timers by playing it safe. And the Trojans have more company these days on the wild side than ever.

If you think former offensive coordinator Norm Chow would have run a different play don't be so sure. Even Chow admits in this article about LenDale White that he would have run the same play.

"Remember the Rose Bowl when Vince beat USC? There was a fourth-and-1, and Reggie Bush was on the sideline. That ought to tell you something. When I had them both at USC, I would have put Bush out there, but LenDale still would have gotten the ball".

I still don't know how he would have put Reggie Bush on the field with 22 personnel. It eliminates a blocker and weakens the run at the point of attack. Reggie was also in the game on the earlier failed 4th and 1 play in the first half....The second guessing never ends...